Politics is a continuation of war by other means...
This seems to be a neat way - by paraphrasing Clausewitz - of describing how David Miliband characterises the complexity of the Counter insurgency strategy that we are pursuing in Afghanistan. In his speech yesterday to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, he added more flesh to the bones of our political strategy which he had first set out in public in July of this year, also to a NATO audience. The key messages are simple: Please do click through and read the whole speech - the detail contained therein is our most comprehensive policy statement on where we need to go next in Afghanistan.
Posted at 09:32 18 November 2009 by Simon Shercliff | Comments[0]
Afghanistan/Pakistan – views from beyond the beltway
Many of my contacts said we should get back to basics: start with the big questions such as “what are our objectives”, and then work back from there, walking through a clear, consistent process with full explanation along the way. We shouldn't invent, they said, artificial criteria of success or failure or find ourselves trying to implement plans that required unsustainable levels of effort. To be fair, I don't think that either the UK or US government would disagree with this approach, and this is what both governments have in fact tried to do.
So my big takeaway from these recent conversations outside the beltway was the need for us policy-makers to take a step back every now and then, raise our heads above the day-to-day grind, and keep our eyes fixed firmly on exactly what it is we want to achieve. Long term relationships are not single aiming points against which we can measure success or failure. But ultimately, I was persuaded, it is them which will keep us all safe from attack.
Posted at 10:07 23 October 2009 by Simon Shercliff | Comments[2]
Looking forward in Afghanistan
Posted at 09:33 19 August 2009 by Simon Shercliff | Comments[0]
The political elements of our Afghanistan Strategy
While many column inches have been devoted in recent weeks to the actions of the British military in Helmand (including by me last week), yesterday at NATO, our Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, outlined the key political elements of our Afghanistan strategy. After stating clearly that our objective in 2001 - the need to deny Al Qaeda a base from which to launch attacks on the world - still holds true in 2009, the basic thrust of his speech was that we can support the Afghan government in dismantling the insurgency which still threatens to provide that base by using the dual approach of military power and political engagement.
It has long been accepted wisdom that military force alone can not achieve lasting success in a counter-insurgency campaign. The role of military operations, such as those currently being conducted by British troops in Helmand, alongside their US and Afghan counterparts, is to deny insurgents the space to operate. Clearing and holding territory allows the Afghan government to extend its reach, delivering basic governance, justice and development. But whether military gains are translated into strategic success will ultimately depend on whether the insurgency is also undermined by politics.
David Miliband said that the future of Afghanistan must be shaped by three political strategies:
- a strategy for dealing with the insurgency through reconciliation and reintegration, leading to an inclusive political settlement in Afghanistan that draws in conservative Pashtun nationalists (providing, of course, they renounce violence and agree to abide by the Afghan political system).
- a strategy for reassuring the wider Afghan population that they have a secure future under the legitimate Afghan government - which will depend on credible, clean government at provincial and district level, working with the grain of tribal Afghan society - and that the international community will stand by them as long as our support is needed (which will be long after the last combat troops have left)
- a strategy for ensuring that Afghanistan's neighbours (including Iran and Pakistan) accept that Afghanistan's future is to be a secure country in its own right, in which each of its neighbours have a responsible and open stake - a friend to all and a client to none, in other words
He finished by setting out the priorities for the next six months, as seen by the British government: the Afghan presidential elections on 20 August must be credible and inclusive. The winning candidate must not only present a clear manifesto, but move quickly to implement it. The biggest shift in 'burden-sharing' must be towards the Afghan state assuming greater responsibility. In Pakistan, the international community must forge a new, sustained and long-term partnership focused in backing civilian institutions and democratic government.
In other words, politics can and must succeed in Afghanistan.
Posted at 08:55 28 July 2009 by Simon Shercliff | Comments[0]
The importance of Panther's Claw
Much has been said and written about the significant increase in fighting that British troops are currently undergoing in Helmand. We all mourn the losses we have suffered, and applaud the unstinting professionalism and bravery of the units involved. Back home in the UK a loud and fractious political debate has erupted over the provision of equipment to the troops, including the numbers of helicopters. But there has been much less of a focus on what is actually going on, and why.
Put simply, these classic military shaping and clearing operations are happening to allow around 80,000 Afghans to exist free from the shadow of the Taliban as the country prepares to vote in the Presidential elections on 20 August. Why is this so important? Because the more Afghans who can participate in deciding the future of their country, and who genuinely buy-in to the process, the more chance Afghanistan has to gather strength as a country and to resist encroachment by AQ and other militant groups.
As usual when our two militaries deploy together, the British operations are being conducted in close coordination with US forces, who are working to exactly the same agenda elsewhere in Helmand (bigger area, but with a lower density of people than where the British forces are). Crucially, they are also being conducted in partnership with the Afghan Security Forces - they are the ones who need to be seen defending their government and protecting their people.
But given that we are conducting a counter-insurgency campaign within a political strategy, the operations are being conducted along with a comprehensive, civilian-led effort to stabilise and develop (hold and build) the parts of Helmand province which most need it.
We all agree that there is no purely military solution to Afghanistan. What is happening in Helmand right now is a concrete example of the strategy President Obama and Prime Minister Brown have set out. We all want the military operations to take the minimum amount of time and resources possible. But they are an essential part of our agreed approach, which will set the foundations for a long-term, civilian-led aid relationship with Afghanistan.
Posted at 17:27 24 July 2009 by Simon Shercliff | Comments[1]
Afghanistan and Pakistan - a combined approach
Today, our Prime Minister announced the British strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In truth it was an update to the strategy that he first announced on December 12 2007. The situation has certainly moved on since then; one of the biggest changes has been the new US policy developed by President Obama. So we did need to review where we were going, and make the necessary changes. Those interested in the detail behind the PM's speech can read more in our White Paper which sets out the way forward.
The main themes in our approach should be familiar to people who have watched the policy debate unfold in the US over the last six months or so:
• while Afghanistan and Pakistan are very different countries, demanding very different approaches, we do need to ensure coherance and coordination between those approaches;
• the cancerous insurgency rife on both sides of the Durand Line can and will only be defeated by a comprehensive approach - with political, military and development strands;
• ultimately it is the people and leadership of those two countries who must come out on top - we must therefore help and support both the people and their governing and security institutions to do just that;
• concentrating on the central government machinery is not enough - local (district and provincial) structures must also be built up and given the confidence to take ownership of their own futures;
• reconciliation, or at the least acknowledging that there will have to be some form of political settlement in the final analysis, is a key part of the approach;
• and finally - most importantly - we should all understand that this problem is a shared problem. It is not just a concern of the US, or the UK, or Afghanistan, or Pakistan, or indeed anyone else. It is in the interests of all of us to carve out a pathway to peace in that part of the world, for our own collective interests. So we should act as a team, with all the various players contributing whatever makes most sense to them, whether that is infantry, money, civilian mentors or even favourable commercial terms for Afghanistan's licit agricultural exports
Posted at 17:15 29 April 2009 by Simon Shercliff | Comments[1]
A long-term commitment in Afghanistan
Afghanistan is a long-term challenge. Nobody wants to see it return to the forgotten, unsupported, failed state that it became after Communism collapsed in the 1990s. But there is no quick fix for situations with the massive complexity of modern-day Afghanistan.
History, geography, religion, poverty all play a part. We need to be clear that long-term, sustained effort - both military and non-military - will be needed to keep Afghanistan moving forward.
Having served for a short time in Afghanistan, I am convinced that there is a better future for Afghanistan - but it will come at a price, and only after a long struggle. The two or three generations of educated, middle-class Afghans who fled first the Soviet invasion in the late 1970s, and then the civil war and Taliban era of the 1990s, took with them most of the professional expertise in the country. Most of those who are left, now running the country, have spent a lifetime fighting - it is not surprising that they find it hard to efficiently run the Ministries of Education or Health, or cannot easily construct the necessary financial systems to bring money to the villages where it is really needed.
We and our allies in the international community need to stay there, keeping the violence at bay, and allowing the younger generations to flourish, for Afghanistan to have a chance at something approaching stability. I hope I will have the chance to go back there - firstly to contribute whatever I can to this aim, and secondly to see a beautiful country with a noble and honourable people finally at peace with itself.
Posted at 09:29 14 October 2008 by Simon Shercliff | Comments[2]
