Simon Shercliff

First Secretary Foreign Security and Policy Washington

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Wednesday 27 January, 2010

Reintegration, Reconciliation - what do we mean?

After comments by Secretary Gates on his recent India/Pakistan trip, and by General McChrystal in the FT, the topic of the moment here in DC is reconciliation/reintegration. Regular readers will know that I have highlighted this issue often in the past. Discussion of reintegration and reconciliation, and indeed simple definition of the terms themselves, is fraught with sensitivity. But given that this discussion will clearly take up much of the London conference, it is important that we are as precise as we can be with the language.
 
This is my take on what we mean - and crucially what we don't mean - when we talk about these issues.
 
Reconciliation is the end game, and it needs the right conditions

The reality is that the way in which insurgencies and civil conflicts end is when a good chunk of those who fight in the insurgency stop the fighting and enter into the political process. These processes inevitably take a long time, and only happen when it is in the interests of the insurgents to stop fighting. This is political reconciliation. It is never one simple policy which forces those interests to change and insurgents to reconcile - it is a whole range of pressures and incentives which  shape the context. We can create policies now, as part of our overall COIN campaign, which we hope will create the right environment. But we must be clear that the ultimate political reconciliation in Afghanistan can only be conducted by Afghans – they will comprise the parties around the table.

Which can be reached by a combination of military and civilian means – pressure and incentives...

To create this context, we have all signed up to a comprehensive COIN strategy, comprising of a military element and a civil/political element.  We need to build a context which will force the insurgency to change its strategic calculus – and stop fighting. The approach has to include both pressure and incentives. Much of the pressure which we need to impose on the insurgency is being delivered by Gen McChrystal and his now much better-resourced ISAF forces.

The London conference is designed to garner international support behind the political elements of a COIN strategy, which could be seen as incentives. Good governance, justice, a chance of relative prosperity, a quiet life – these are all incentives. The fact is that many Afghans have not been convinced that what we are doing will deliver these incentives. We want London to give a strong international push to Afghan plans to deliver these incentives. As I wrote before (link to 19 Jan blog), one of the key elements to this political package is a reintegration programme.

... one of which is reintegration

So, as one of the building blocks of the context which will allow for eventual reconciliation, a reintegration programme means offering low-level insurgents – footsoldiers –  a better deal: some form of employment prospects; safety for themselves and their families in return for a pledge not to return to violence and to abide by the Afghan constitution. This has often been called splitting or dismantling the insurgency. We hope that the London conference will result in a strong showing of international support (including money) for an Afghan-led  reintegration programme.
 
And none of which is striking a power-sharing deal with the Taliban, or anyone who follows their practices

The Afghan government and people know that none of the countries with militaries deployed in Afghanistan can promise current levels of military investment for the indefinite future. But, as the US and UK governments in particular have promised, they can expect us to remain invested politically and economically in Afghanistan for the very long term. This inherent tension - between staying and going - is easily twisted into conspiracy theories over our intentions, and ultimately distorts the reconciliation debate: i.e. people accuse us of wanting to strike a 'power-sharing' deal with the Taliban so we can leave quickly. No we do not want to do that, and as I said earlier, such a deal is not ours to make. What we do want to do is to help create the conditions so that the Afghan Government can lead a reconciliation process with all the various parties involved in Afghanistan.

Crucially, these conditions include giving no room for the insurgency to hold on to the medieval practices of the Taliban, which are disbarred in the Afghan constitution, and  which poll after poll of the Afghan people show that only a tiny minority actually want. We believe that we can create those conditions with a combination of a big military push this year (as requested by Gen McChrystal) and meaningful political policies, including reintegration.

Which means that reintegration, leading to reconciliation, will not catch everyone.

There will always be irreconcilables - those who, effectively, choose to fight to the death. What we want to do is to split off those who are interested in reintegrating themselves into normal Afghan life. By doing so, and in combination with a well-resourced military campaign, we gradually regain the initiative and build momentum to the point where political reconciliation at the higher levels is possible. As for the irreconcilable rump, as President Obama said on 27 March last year, "must be met with force, and ... must be defeated".

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Tuesday 19 January, 2010

What we want out of the London Conference

It is well known now that the British Government are hosting a big international conference on Afghanistan on 28 January in London. We wanted to build a platform form which the international community could re-focus their efforts and support for Afghanistan as we all move forward after the events of last year – both good and bad (the Afghan Presidential elections, two US reviews on policy and strategy, the increasing levels of insurgency and the increasing US-led international military activity). Our Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, will be here in DC next week for a final series of high-level meetings with his US counterparts before the conference – this after visits earlier in January to both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

One unusual element of his trip will be a public meeting he will have with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 21 Jan, at the invitation of the Chairman, Senator Kerry. Both Senator Kerry and David Miliband thought that this would be an excellent opportunity to air in public the key drivers not just for the London conference, but also for the approach to which we think we need to commit form now on. Readers of this blog will be familiar with some of the issues I list below which comprise this framework.

The overarching issue is the urgent need to match General McChrystal’s widely acclaimed military strategy with a clear political strategy aimed at winning the support of the Afghan population; dividing the insurgency; and ensuring the constructive engagement of Afghanistan’s neighbours.

So we think the conference will help build this increased political momentum, as well as reiterate and marshal international support. There are three areas on which the conference will focus to do this:

  • security (which in the political strategy means driving forward the ways and means to reintegrate former insurgents to normal life in Afghanistan – i.e. to offer them a better deal in life than fighting against the Afghan government);
  • development and governance (speaks for itself – but the key here is the international community supporting the efforts of the Afghan authorities rather than us imposing our own ideas, systems and will from the outside. The trickiness of the Presidential elections last year, combined with the ongoing fall-out (President Karzai still not able to get his full cabinet confirmed by the Majles) underline how difficult this is);
  • regional relations. This remains possible the most difficult basket of issues. But, put simply, there can be no peace in that part of the world unless Afghanistan neighbours firstly recognise that it is in their interests to work together, and then pull together in such areas as trade and security cooperation.

More detail on exactly what this means (i.e. potential outcomes from the conference) to come.

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Friday 08 January, 2010

London Conference

I'm away on holiday this week but wanted to point out the Foreign Secretary's new YouTube video in which he introduces the upcoming London Conference on Afghanistan. I'll be blogging about the conference in the coming weeks as it's a key landmark on our road to helping Afghans secure and stabilize their country. But for now, please watch the Foreign Secretary's video and visit our new website for the conference.

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