Simon Shercliff

First Secretary Foreign Security and Policy Washington

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Wednesday 18 November, 2009

Politics is a continuation of war by other means...

This seems to be a neat way - by paraphrasing Clausewitz - of describing how David Miliband characterises the complexity of the Counter insurgency strategy that we are pursuing in Afghanistan. In his speech yesterday to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, he added more flesh to the bones of our political strategy which he had first set out in public in July of this year, also to a NATO audience. The key messages are simple: 

  • "In the UK we support the prosecution of a serious counter-insurgency effort in Afghanistan. We do not see that as an alternative to counter-terrorism, but as the best means to achieve it"
  • "we all agree that there can be no purely military solution; so let's take that mantra seriously"... recognise that we will succeed in Afghanistan only when our military resources and development assistance are aligned behind a clear political strategy"
  • "The goals of a political strategy are clear: to unite a critical mass of the key players behind shared goals - AQ kept out, the different tribal groups {that make up the rich heritage of Afghanistan] kept onside, and the neighbours prepared to play a constructive role in Afghanistan's future"
  • "I stress that a political strategy is not separate from a military strategy, or vice-versa. Each must be part of a single whole". 
  • And finally, the framework of the political strategy: "To be successful the political strategy must address three audiences. First, the Afghan people and their loyalty: to reassure and mobilise citizens to resist the Taliban, military effort to improve security must be allied to civilian effort to improve governance especially at the local level. Second, the insurgents and their determination to fight: military pressure to beat back the insurgency must be combined with support to flip sides rather than fight or run away. Third, Afghanistan’s neighbours: a new relationship must be forged between Afghanistan and its neighbours, based on the understanding that Afghanistan’s future is not as a client of any, but as a secure country in its own right.

 

Please do click through and read the whole speech - the detail contained therein is our most comprehensive policy statement on where we need to go next in Afghanistan.

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Friday 23 October, 2009

Afghanistan/Pakistan – views from beyond the beltway

Last week I had an excellent few days in both New York and Boston talking to various scholars, think tankers and interested parties on Afghanistan and Pakistan policy. As expected, people were pretty opinionated over the current Obama review process. Whilst there were inevitably criticisms from some over western policy , I got the impression that  nearly everyone there felt that the main media debate over the last few weeks on whether to accept McChrystal’s suggested approach or not was not really the core issue at stake. 

Many of my contacts said we should get back to basics: start with the big questions such as “what are our objectives”, and then work back from there, walking through a clear, consistent process with full explanation along the way. We shouldn't invent, they said, artificial criteria  of success or failure or find ourselves trying to implement plans that required unsustainable levels of effort.  To be fair, I don't think that either the UK or US government would disagree with this approach, and this is what both governments have in fact tried to do.
 
A lot of the noise around the  discussion of "nation-building" in Afghanistan has become divorced from what we are trying to achieve. Put simply, we want to  get  the Afghan people to a stage where they are able to design and maintain their own way of life which is robust enough to repel the likes of Al Qaida from taking root there ever again (and from such a foothold in Afghanistan, then to attack us). Similar objectives exist for Pakistan. Ultimately, this means a long-term relationship  between our countries and the people of both Afghanistan and Pakistan built and sustained by mutual trust. That is why the Kerry-Lugar bill is so important – it sets the foundation for just such a relationship between Pakistan and the US. We want to reassure the Afghan people too that our commitment there will be long term, although of course not demonstrated by thousands of troops for the long term.  

So my big takeaway from these recent conversations outside the beltway was the need for us policy-makers to take a step back every now and then, raise our heads above the day-to-day grind, and keep our eyes fixed firmly on exactly what it is we want to achieve. Long term relationships are not single aiming points against which we can measure success or failure. But ultimately, I was persuaded, it is them which will keep us all safe from attack.

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Wednesday 19 August, 2009

Looking forward in Afghanistan

Nearly there now - the Afghan Presidential and Provincial Council elections happen on Thursday this week. Plenty has been said and written about them already, so I will not add much more here. Suffice to say that President Obama has often described these elections as "the most important event in Afghanistan this year". They are hugely important, for us all - elections that are perceived by the Afghan people as credible, inclusive and secure will provide momentum to the task that we are all engaged in: helping Afghanistan stand on its own as a self-confident, robust state which can repel the likes of Al Qaida from ever again taking root in their country. In spite of the mood of intimidation which the Taliban are trying desprately to forge (including those two terrible suicide attacks in Kabul over the last couple of days), I hope that the Afghan people will participate wholeheartedly, and with optimism that these elections will help them along their difficult path.
 
In addressing the ongoing insurgency and forthcoming elections, David Miliband wrote Monday in the Daily Telegraph that "whether military breakthroughs are translated into strategic success depends on politics". Essentially this means that  "only legitimate, clean and competent Afghan government, recognising local tribal structures as well as national democratic ones, can provide an alternative focus for loyalty [for the Afghan people]. Effective protection and a better life is the best way to keep the insurgency at bay". And once the elections are over, that "there are three priorities for the new government if it is to defeat the insurgency and build a more stable and prosperous state". These are: 

 

  • a clear determination to protect the interests of ordinary Afghans - this means better governance. 
  • a strategy to reconcile and reintegrate insurgents prepared to give up violence.
  • better cooperation with Afghanistan's neighbours, particularly Pakistan.

 

He concludes that "the next Afghan government has a duty to show its determination to root out corruption, the dedication to build a state that properly protects its people and the vision to build an inclusive political settlement. In that work they deserve strong international support. Britain's job is to be part of that effort".
 
Readers might like to link through to this new site just published by the British Government's Afghan unit in London. It pulls together all of our relevant material on the forthcoming Afghan elections, plus further links to other interesting articles, including a blog by Lisa Bandari, one of my political officer colleagues out in the British Embassy in Kabul, who has been following the elections build-up closely for several months.

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Friday 07 August, 2009

Afghanistan elections

Guest post by Richard O'Hara. Richard is a Second Secretary, Political, at the British Embassy in Washington, focussing on Afghanistan and Pakistan. He has been in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office since 2004, and was posted to Afghanistan during 2007 and 2008. Most recently, Richard was on secondment to the US Department of State for nine months, working on their Afghanistan Desk.

All Afghan-watchers know that on 20 August, Afghans take to the polls to vote for their next President. On 5 August, British Ambassador to Afghanistan Mark Sedwill gave a briefing to the media about the build up to the elections. The UK, and the wider international community, has been focusing on helping create a level playfield for all the candidates, and assisting the Afghans to ensure that these elections are credible, secure and inclusive. These elections are an opportunity for Afghans to choose their next leadership. They also represent a chance to reflect on the last eight years in Afghanistan, and to look ahead to the future. After the 2004 Presidential elections, then the 2005 Parliamentary and Provincial Council elections, these are the third national-scale elections in Afghanistan since 2001 and, for the first time, the elections will be run by the Afghans themselves.

41 Afghans registered to run in the presidential election and although a few have dropped out along the campaign trail, it remains a packed field. The main figures are well known, but apart from Karzai, Abdullah and Ghani, the others include a healthy and diverse mixture of Members of Parliament, ex-Cabinet Ministers, businessmen and even former members of the Taliban. Campaign rallies have been seen across the country, walls and billboards have been festooned with colourful candidate posters, and many candidates have participated in radio and TV debates.

But conducting these elections will be a challenge. History has shown us that the second set of elections in post-conflict countries are often the most difficult, and violence has increased in Afghanistan since the last elections in 2004 and 2005. Efforts by Afghan and International forces have focused on providing sufficient security to enable as many Afghans as possible to cast their vote. The recent increase in fighting in Helmand has, in great part, been about giving more of the local population the opportunity to access polling stations safely (up to 30% more of the Helmand population are now free from Taliban control than was the case two months ago). Yes these elections will look rather different from what we saw here in 2008, but this is democracy in the Afghan context - and that is something we should all support. No-one can argue against our strong, collective desire to allow ordinary Afghans a say in the way their affairs are run.

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Tuesday 28 July, 2009

The political elements of our Afghanistan Strategy

While many column inches have been devoted in recent weeks to the actions of the British military in Helmand (including by me last week), yesterday at NATO, our Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, outlined the key political elements of our Afghanistan strategy. After stating clearly that our objective in 2001 - the need to deny Al Qaeda a base from which to launch attacks on the world - still holds true in 2009, the basic thrust of his speech was that we can support the Afghan government in dismantling the insurgency which still threatens to provide that base by using the dual approach of military power and political engagement.

It has long been accepted wisdom that military force alone can not achieve lasting success in a counter-insurgency campaign. The role of military operations, such as those currently being conducted by British troops in Helmand, alongside their US and Afghan counterparts, is to deny insurgents the space to operate. Clearing and holding territory allows the Afghan government to extend its reach, delivering basic governance, justice and development. But whether military gains are translated into strategic success will ultimately depend on whether the insurgency is also undermined by politics.

David Miliband said that the future of Afghanistan must be shaped by three political strategies:

  • a strategy for dealing with the insurgency through reconciliation and reintegration, leading to an inclusive political settlement in Afghanistan that draws in conservative Pashtun nationalists (providing, of course, they renounce violence and agree to abide by the Afghan political system).
  • a strategy for reassuring the wider Afghan population that they have a secure future under the legitimate Afghan government - which will depend on credible, clean government at provincial and district level, working with the grain of tribal Afghan society - and that the international community will stand by them as long as our support is needed (which will be long after the last combat troops have left)
  • a strategy for ensuring that Afghanistan's neighbours (including Iran and Pakistan) accept that Afghanistan's future is to be a secure country in its own right, in which each of its neighbours have a responsible and open stake - a friend to all and a client to none, in other words

 

He finished by setting out the priorities for the next six months, as seen by the British government: the Afghan presidential elections on 20 August must be credible and inclusive. The winning candidate must not only present a clear manifesto, but move quickly to implement it. The biggest shift in 'burden-sharing' must be towards the Afghan state assuming greater responsibility. In Pakistan, the international community must forge a new, sustained and long-term partnership focused in backing civilian institutions and democratic government. 

In other words, politics can and must succeed in Afghanistan.

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Friday 24 July, 2009

The importance of Panther's Claw

Much has been said and written about the significant increase in fighting that British troops are currently undergoing in Helmand. We all mourn the losses we have suffered, and applaud the unstinting professionalism and bravery of the units involved. Back home in the UK a loud and fractious political debate has erupted over the provision of equipment to the troops, including the numbers of helicopters. But there has been much less of a focus on what is actually going on, and why.

Put simply, these classic military shaping and clearing operations are happening to allow around 80,000 Afghans to exist free from the shadow of the Taliban as the country prepares to vote in the Presidential elections on 20 August. Why is this so important? Because the more Afghans who can participate in deciding the future of their country, and who genuinely buy-in to the process, the more chance Afghanistan has to gather strength as a country and to resist encroachment by AQ and other militant groups.

As usual when our two militaries deploy together, the British operations are being conducted in close coordination with US forces, who are working to exactly the same agenda elsewhere in Helmand (bigger area, but with a lower density of people than where the British forces are). Crucially, they are also being conducted in partnership with the Afghan Security Forces - they are the ones who need to be seen defending their government and protecting their people.

But given that we are conducting a counter-insurgency campaign within a political strategy, the operations are being conducted along with a comprehensive, civilian-led effort to stabilise and develop (hold and build) the parts of Helmand province which most need it.

We all agree that there is no purely military solution to Afghanistan. What is happening in Helmand right now is a concrete example of the strategy President Obama and Prime Minister Brown have set out. We all want the military operations to take the minimum amount of time and resources possible. But they are an essential part of our agreed approach, which will set the foundations for a long-term, civilian-led aid relationship with Afghanistan.

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Friday 05 June, 2009

We promise to stay, and we promise to go

One small part of President Obama's much-heralded speech in Cairo this week hit squarely the two key planks of both the US and the UK's Afghanistan/Pakistan policy: 1) a promise to bring troops out as soon as we are confident that there is no threat eminating from" violent extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan determined to kill as many Americans [or Brits] as they possibly can"; and 2) a promise to continue building and strengthening our respective relationships with the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments and people, not least through long-term, non-military assistance programmes.

Obama said: "make no mistake: we do not want to keep our troops in Afghanistan. We seek no military bases there". To the extent that we can work out accurately the motivations of the various parts of the insurgency in Afghanistan, we continually find that straightforward nationalism plays a part (just one part). The stationing of one country's troops on another country's soil has always, and almost universally, generated this characteristic, anywhere in the world. The people of Afghanistan, of whichever ethnic group, are no exception. We need to continue to make clear that we have no designs on any form of long-term, military occupation of these proud people.

But in the same breath, this policy needs to be balanced by another clear message - again President Obama brought it out in his speech. While the US and UK, and all our other allies, want to bring our combat troops home as soon as we can, we also want to emphasise that our governments are setting up a long-term commitment to support Afghanistan and Pakistan, politically and through our respective overseas aid departments. Obama said: "we also know that military power alone is not going to solve the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan. That is why we plan to invest $1.5 billion each year over the next five years to partner with Pakistanis to build schools and hospitals, roads and businesses, and hundreds of millions to help those who have been displaced". The UK has commited $811 million to Afghanistan over the next four years - this is one our our biggest overseas aid commitments. We need to reinforce the message at every turn that we are not going to cut and run. We will not leave both coutries to whatever fate befalls them, once we decide that the threat to us has subsided.

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Wednesday 29 April, 2009

Afghanistan and Pakistan - a combined approach

Today, our Prime Minister announced the British strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In truth it was an update to the strategy that he first announced on December 12 2007. The situation has certainly moved on since then; one of the biggest changes has been the new US policy developed by President Obama. So we did need to review where we were going, and make the necessary changes. Those interested in the detail behind the PM's speech can read more in our White Paper which sets out the way forward.

The main themes in our approach should be familiar to people who have watched the policy debate unfold in the US over the last six months or so:

• while Afghanistan and Pakistan are very different countries, demanding very different approaches, we do need to ensure coherance and coordination between those approaches;

• the cancerous insurgency rife on both sides of the Durand Line can and will only be defeated by a comprehensive approach - with political, military and development strands; 

• ultimately it is the people and leadership of those two countries who must come out on top - we must therefore help and support both the people and their governing and security institutions to do just that;

• concentrating on the central government machinery is not enough - local (district and provincial) structures must also be built up and given the confidence to take ownership of their own futures;

• reconciliation, or at the least acknowledging that there will have to be some form of political settlement in the final analysis, is a key part of the approach;

• and finally - most importantly - we should all understand that this problem is a shared problem. It is not just a concern of the US, or the UK, or Afghanistan, or Pakistan, or indeed anyone else. It is in the interests of all of us to carve out a pathway to peace in that part of the world, for our own collective interests. So we should act as a team, with all the various players contributing whatever makes most sense to them, whether that is infantry, money, civilian mentors or even favourable commercial terms for Afghanistan's licit agricultural exports

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Tuesday 16 December, 2008

More troops to Afghanistan?

Since the then candidate Obama (much earlier this year) pledged more US troops to help resolve the worsening security situation in Afghanistan, many people have joined that bandwagon. Sounds reasonable: the way to deal with more violence under any circumstances is often by having a greater security presence, and one thing that everyone can agree on about Afghanistan right now is that the security situation is not good, and trending in the wrong direction. Secretary Gates and others have now outlined US plans for up to three more combat battalions deploying to Afghanistan next year, so the intent (clearly shared by the current Administration - Gates still works for President Bush) is becoming real. There has been plenty of speculation in the international media and blogosphere about the UK sending significantly more troops to Afghanistan as we wind down our presence in Iraq during 2009. For us, this speculation remains just that: no final decisions have been taken on major troop uplifts. But we have, however, deployed 300 troops of the Theatre Reserve to Afghanistan between now and August 2009 (as annoucend by the Prime Minister today).

But my conversations around Washington over the last few weeks on the future of Afghanistan policy have gone much deeper than pure troop numbers. Our militaries, fantastically brave and resilient as they are, can only march forward towards success if they are part of a more comprehensive effort. These extra military deployments are being discussed within that context: more civilians; better targetted and coordinated development projects; and above all an Afghan government leading its people in a credible fashion. No one would claim to have found the silver bullet. But there is a definite consensus emerging on the major principle: Afghanistan cannot be solved by military means alone.

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Tuesday 14 October, 2008

A long-term commitment in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a long-term challenge. Nobody wants to see it return to the forgotten, unsupported, failed state that it became after Communism collapsed in the 1990s. But there is no quick fix for situations with the massive complexity of modern-day Afghanistan.

History, geography, religion, poverty all play a part. We need to be clear that long-term, sustained effort - both military and non-military - will be needed to keep Afghanistan moving forward.

Having served for a short time in Afghanistan, I am convinced that there is a better future for Afghanistan - but it will come at a price, and only after a long struggle. The two or three generations of educated, middle-class Afghans who fled first the Soviet invasion in the late 1970s, and then the civil war and Taliban era of the 1990s, took with them most of the professional expertise in the country. Most of those who are left, now running the country, have spent a lifetime fighting - it is not surprising that they find it hard to efficiently run the Ministries of Education or Health, or cannot easily construct the necessary financial systems to bring money to the villages where it is really needed. 

We and our allies in the international community need to stay there, keeping the violence at bay, and allowing the younger generations to flourish, for Afghanistan to have a chance at something approaching stability. I hope I will have the chance to go back there - firstly to contribute whatever I can to this aim, and secondly to see a beautiful country with a noble and honourable people finally at peace with itself.

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