Simon Shercliff

Afghanistan and Pakistan - a combined approach

Today, our Prime Minister announced the British strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In truth it was an update to the strategy that he first announced on December 12 2007. The situation has certainly moved on since then; one of the biggest changes has been the new US policy developed by President Obama. So we did need to review where we were going, and make the necessary changes. Those interested in the detail behind the PM's speech can read more in our White Paper which sets out the way forward.

The main themes in our approach should be familiar to people who have watched the policy debate unfold in the US over the last six months or so:

• while Afghanistan and Pakistan are very different countries, demanding very different approaches, we do need to ensure coherance and coordination between those approaches;

• the cancerous insurgency rife on both sides of the Durand Line can and will only be defeated by a comprehensive approach - with political, military and development strands; 

• ultimately it is the people and leadership of those two countries who must come out on top - we must therefore help and support both the people and their governing and security institutions to do just that;

• concentrating on the central government machinery is not enough - local (district and provincial) structures must also be built up and given the confidence to take ownership of their own futures;

• reconciliation, or at the least acknowledging that there will have to be some form of political settlement in the final analysis, is a key part of the approach;

• and finally - most importantly - we should all understand that this problem is a shared problem. It is not just a concern of the US, or the UK, or Afghanistan, or Pakistan, or indeed anyone else. It is in the interests of all of us to carve out a pathway to peace in that part of the world, for our own collective interests. So we should act as a team, with all the various players contributing whatever makes most sense to them, whether that is infantry, money, civilian mentors or even favourable commercial terms for Afghanistan's licit agricultural exports

Posted at 17:15 29 April 2009 by Simon Shercliff  |  Comments[1]