Ruairi O'Connell

Deputy Head of British Embassy in Pristina

FCO Logo
Tuesday 01 July, 2008

The Dog that Didn't Bark

A weekend trip to the Albanian coast - nine hours, but worth it to find a beautiful, and genuinely unspoiled, beach at the end.

A chance piece of graffiti, however, set me thinking. By the main road in Fier, a town in Southern Albania, someone had written a slogan, roughly translated as 'Long Live Ethnic Albania!'

It occurred to me that 'Greater Albania' was the dog that didn't - and still doesn't - bark. The graffiti was striking because, living in Kosovo, I had never seen the slogan before. Whilst it is possible to meet people who long for a union with Albania, they are a tiny minority in Kosovo (and, I suspect, in Albania too). The graffiti was notable for its rarity.

What are not rare, however, are the Albanian flags which are still common throughout Kosovo (especially during wedding season, when they are waved from cars in the bridal procession). The Kosovo Albanian community still maintains a strong sense of being 'Albanian' - much as Kosovo's Serbs, Roma, Turks, Bosniaks seem themselves as Serbian, Roma, Turkish and Bosniak, in the 'ethnic' sense of the word. It is interesting, however, that for Kosovo Albanians especially, the strong sense of ethnic identity has not translated into a movement for political unification.

There are various reasons for this. The Albanian language spoken in Kosovo is different from that spoken in much of Albania (but all Albanian speakers would claim to speak a common language). Moreover, the experience of the Albanian communities in Albania and Kosovo has diverged greatly since the First World War, most obviously with the Kosovo Albanians' experience under Milosevic. The experience of autonomy in Socialist Yugoslavia (and its withdrawal under Milosevic) cast the political question in very Kosovo-centric terms, as well as creating a "Kosovar" identity (albeit a fluid one which overlaps with other layers). In similar terms, the Kosovo Serb experience under Yugoslavia, forming much of the administrative and military elite for the whole country, mitigated against the formation of a separate Kosovo Serb identity, and towards identification with Serbia (of which Kosovo was a province).

Of course, identity, by its nature, is fluid, and often defies exact definition (and for this reason, I hope to see lots of comments on the blog - and expect most of them to disagree vehemently with me!) But in any case, there has been very limited political activism (in my experience) for a 'Greater Albania'. Of all the provisions in the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal , the prohibition on union with other countries was the easiest to sell to the Kosovo Albanians.

  • Share this with:
Thursday 26 June, 2008

Lunch with the Kosovo Minister of Education

Lunch yesterday with Enver Hoxhaj, the Kosovo Minister of Education.

He has a significant challenge in front of him. Most socialist societies in transition benefit from having had a decent (and often excellent) educational system. Not so Kosovo. Following years of neglect since the second World War, under Milosevic, the K-Albanians were forcibly thrown out of the education system (the Milosevic-era Rector of Pristina University even suggested that Albanians should not 'even be given a pencil', lest they learn to become terrorists; he was later appointed Rector of the Mitrovica University by the Kostunica Government). For nearly ten years, K-Albanians had no access to the education system. Instead, they were taught in private homes which served as informal schools and universities, supported by voluntary funding from the diaspora. Throughout this period, teachers - and pupils - were subject to constant harassment and intimidation (and worse) from the police.

On top of this, schools were caught up in the systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Whilst schools in major towns were left intact (as the Serbian authorities would use them for the Serbian community), those in the villages were destroyed (along with houses and other buildings); in one part of Kosovo, 60% of schools are still accommodated in portakabins, which are hardly suitable for winters that can reach -20C.

After the war UNMIK and the creation of the Kosovo Ministry for Education, tried to redress the wrongs of the past. Importantly, the right to education in one's own language was guaranteed early on in Kosovo law (and further guaranteed by the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal ).

In 2005, we were approached by the municipality of Novo Brdo/Novobërdë to help support the construction of a school in the municipality. Their concept was to (re)create a multiethnic school; separate classes would be organised in both Serbian and Albanian, but practical classes and sports would be organised together. This was an initiative of the K-Serb mayor, and seemed a great way to use education to bring the communities together. We rapidly agreed.

However, whilst the school is now built, and due to open in September, we fell foul of attempts to use education as a weapon of ethnic separation. The Serbian government from 2005 started to put pressure on K-Serbian teachers to withdraw from receiving Kosovo salaries, and work exclusively for the 'Serbian' parallel authorities; pupils were to be taught in 'Serbian' schools with no contact with other communities. Our hopes to have this school used by both Serbs and Albanians fell foul of this; the K-Serb pupils, rather than using a school in their own village, are still forced to travel for miles to their own separate school. Even the K-Serb mayor and officials couldn't shield their community from this pressure. It is still depressing to see such policies in action, leading the K-Serbian community into a dead end.

To end on a positive note, I met representatives from Hope and Aid Direct , a UK charity bringing aid to vulnerable communities in Kosovo. Having seen the awful situation, they developed a 'school in a box project' to bring basic supplies to Kosovo schools (a lucky rural school will have windows and heating; many don't have enough desks or chairs, and are forced to re-use paper until there is no space left) [just moved this to the end of the sentence]. They rely on donations from the public in the UK, and from businesses generously donating surpluses. He was here, in part, to discuss ways of reaching those most at need in all ethnic communities (their slogan is "we bring aid, not sides"); so having seen one education project fall foul of attempts to use education to divide people, it was heartening to talk to someone trying to use education to help all of Kosovo's communities; regardless of ethnicity, they all need rapid investment in education.

 

  • Share this with:
Thursday 19 June, 2008

Blog: EURO 2008

Watching Sweden vs Russia last night on a big screen in central Pristina (provided by the Swiss Government - and winning them a high profile and lots of friends in football-mad Kosovo!) made me realise how much EURO 2008 says about Kosovo.

Firstly, the positive image of Europe. Kosovo's citizens (of all ethnicities) share the aspiration to join (eventually) the European Union. But they bristle, understandably, at the suggestion (made usually by foreigners) that they might, one day, 'join Europe'. They counter that, whilst they want to join the EU, they are already part of Europe - geographically, culturally, and emotionally. This is a source of considerably pride, perhaps not obvious to those of us whose European identity is not under question. And this positive image of Europe expresses itself in the least expected places. One TV commentator here insists in calling spectular goals "Eurogoals" (as in 'what a Eurogoal from Christiano Ronaldo). The popular Balkan chocolate spread is called 'Eurokrem' too; so the prefex 'euro' carries a mark of quality and luxury.

Secondly, it's easy to see how qualifying for major sporting events (like EURO 2008) is a source of national pride. But for Kosovo, denied the chance to participate in sporting events since Milosevic came to power, international sporting competition is all the more important. I spoke last month to the head of the Kosovo Olympic Committee, who is trying (without much success so far) to get Kosovo athletes to the Beijing Olympics (I understand Kosovo has some credible boxers and weightlifters); they will redouble their efforts to make it to London in 2012. So Kosovo football fans have mixed feelings watching EURO 2008; they enjoy the spectacle, but wish they had at least a chance to qualify.

Thirdly, football tournaments in general illustrate the relationship of the Kosovo diaspora (about whom I have previously written) with their host country. The diaspora has been a bedrock of support for Kosovo's Albanian community since the early 1990s - both financially and politically. So it is intriguing to see the strength of support for the 'host' countries' teams - especially Germany, Switzerland, Austria and Sweden, who have large Kosovo Albanian diaspora, but also England (although sadly not this time). This stretches from people who now hold the citizenship of the host state, to those who spent a few years or months there (and even who may have been returned unwillingly to Kosovo). I am still struck by how quickly the K-Albanians adopt the identity of the host state, and the strength of gratitude towards it - and how they see no contradiction in remaining proudly Albanian.

Finally, the fans at the big screen show how Kosovo is still a very political place; whether a team gets supported seems to depend on whether or not the country has recognised Kosovo. A reminder, lest we forget the importance of independence.

 

  • Share this with:
Friday 09 May, 2008

The Kosovo Question

No - not 'that' Kosovo question; that one was answered on 17 February

There is another question that anyone who has spent time in Kosovo will have heard. I was at a modern dance workshop last weekend (I wasn't doing the dancing...) when I heard it again. The workshop was held by two US 'cultural envoys' , two modern dance instructors working with various dance groups in Kosovo, including the National Ballet. At the end of the session, one of the audience asked the envoys what I call the Kosovo Question - "how do our (in this case) dancers compare internationally?"

This gives a real insight into Kosovo. Kosovo's population under Milosevic (and commonly throughout the twentieth century) was surpressed, isolated, and often struggling to make ends meet from day-to-day. The first casualty of this was Kosovo's cultural life - be it the arts, media or sport. As Kosovo begins to make use of the new opportunities since 1999, people here naturally want to know how they compare. This stems in part from the natural pride of a brand new country, in part in reflection of a desire to learn and develop. But it also betrays a certain need for affirmation, and confirmation that Kosovo is on the right path. Again, after such isolation, this is understandable.

And, for the record, the US visitors were impressed by the technical skills of the Kosovo Ballet.

  • Share this with:
Thursday 17 April, 2008

The Kosovo Diaspora

Away from Kosovo for ten days; a good time to think about the impact of the Kosovo diaspora.

During the 1990s, driven by political repression and economic hardship, large numbers of Kosovo Albanians left Kosovo -the Kosovo government estimate that 17% (of a population of 1.8-2.4m) live outside Kosovo. A large number of Kosovo Turks also left (mostly to Turkey), and Kosovo Serbs (mostly to Serbia, where there were better economic opportunities). At the same time, Milosevic settled large numbers of Serbs displaced from Croatia and Bosnia in Kosovo - many of whom left, along with other Kosovo Serbs, following the entry of NATO and UNMIK in 1999 (and also following revenge attacks immediately after the conflict).

Historically, diaspora communities, especially in the US and Western Europe, have exerted vast influence on conflicts. In many cases, the diaspora have provided funding. But otherwise, they provide a community in which activists can mobilise, and a way of energising Western opinion. However, as the conflict progresses, the diaspora can be a brake to progress; they often remain untouched by reconciliation initiatives, and remain relatively unaffected by the privations of conflict. Historically, there is some evidence that diaspora continue to fund conflicts, in part to maintain a link with their country of origin; what price the feeling of patriotism?

Kosovo is no different regarding the influence the Kosovo Albanian diaspora had on Kosovo. Much of a generation left Kosovo in search of work and educational opportunities from the early 1990s onwards. During the 1990s, diaspora funds (through a levy collected by the 'government-in-exile') supported the parallel education and healthcare systems for the Kosovo Albanians, after Serbia had excluded them from state structures. Through remittances, most Kosovo Albanian families received help from relatives in the diaspora (help that continues today and is vital for Kosovo's economy). It printed newspapers, and, along with the BBC world service, provided a source of information in Kosovo. It acted as a base for lobbying on Kosovo. As Milosevic stepped up his campaign in Kosovo, and the KLA emerged in the mid-1990s, the diaspora also provided funding - and recruits - for the new force.

The Kosovo Albanian diaspora still has a vital role to play. Importantly, the diaspora has, in the main, supported the compromises made by the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo as part of the final status process; this has been important in making them stick. The money has also kept on coming, but, perhaps, in lesser amounts than before. This is, however, a mixed blessing. The funds are vital to support many families, but they also distort the labour market. Kosovo has a relatively high 'reservation wage' (the notional wage necessary to attract new entrants into the labour market) compared to the region, which could potentially serve as an obstacle to economic development. The trick for Kosovo's government is to channel these payments away from support to everyday consumption and investment in Kosovo's future.

There is also a Kosovo Serb diaspora of sorts, consisting of those with links to Kosovo, and those displaced following the war. It is clear that the Kosovo institutions must do all that they can to show that, just as with Kosovo Albanians who left during the 1990s, Kosovo Serbs who left subsequently have a place in Kosovo's future. Not an easy task; but the alternative - separation and festering resentment - helps no-one.

  • Share this with:
Wednesday 23 January, 2008

My Irish grandmother used to tell me a story.

A man found himself in the back of beyond, totally lost. Finally, after driving round in the dark for hours, he comes across an old farmer on a horse and cart. Winding down the window, he leans across and asks "Excuse me - I'm not from round here; could you help me get back to Dublin?"

The old farmer thinks for a while, then says: "Oh, I can get you back to Dublin all right - but I wouldn't start from here".

The point is, we can only deal with the situation we find ourselves in. Despite our efforts during the 1990s, the policies of Slobodan Milosevic and his government created the situation in Kosovo in early 1999 where NATO had no option but to intervene in order to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe (for background, look at the FCO Kosovo profile, or at the International Crisis Group website -  for another perspective). Yes, Kosovo has a history of ethnic conflict that reaches back into history. Yes, Albanians weren't the only victims. But one cannot get away from the central issue; what the Milosevic regime did in Kosovo changed everything - and limited the possible solutions.

I often quote the example of Veton Surroi to my Kosovo Serb friends. Here is the son of a Yugoslav diplomat, who was closely involved in the Yugoslavia-wide drive for democracy at the start of the 1990s. A decade later, he is part of the 'Unity Team', leading Kosovo's efforts for independence. The events of the 1990s led him on this journey.

So, we are where we are. We have to deal with the situation as best we can. And we do have to deal with it, right now; this is vital for European Security, but, most importantly of all, to give all the people of Kosovo a hope for a better life. With all of this in mind, that's why the British government supports President Ahtisaari's proposal for the final status of Kosovo as the best way forward. This settlement gives us all a way of dealing with the past, and, importantly, a range of protections for those who feel most vulnerable and isolated in Kosovo, especailly the Kosovo Serb community.

We are right at the end of the political process now - the crucial time. The EU is ready to assume its responsibilities in dealing with Kosovo [PDF] (paras 65-71). The process is ready to move forward. That's why communication and dialogue are so important.

And so to the blog. I hope that this blog can provide a place to discuss the process that Kosovo is about to go through, and the work of what we in the British Office do to support this process. It's clear that Kosovo incites considerable passions (just look at comments on any Kosovo video on youtube). But equally, we have a responsibility to explain our views, to engage with people with different perspectives, and to keep communicating. That's diplomacy - and a large part of my job in the British Office (which will feature in a future entry in this blog). So I hope that people will add comments - and I will make every effort to reply to your comments, questions and ideas.

  • Share this with:

Calendar

Search

Feeds

Tag cloud

FCO bloggers

FCO partners overseas

FCO websites

UK government websites

Your feedback