Ruairi O'Connell

Rule of Law in Kosovo - and why it matters to us

I chaired a meeting on 24 June drawing together 'Rule of Law' experts from across the British Government to talk about support to the Rule of Law in Kosovo.

In an impoverished, post conflict part of Europe, it is clear that establishing a functioning rule of law is a top priority - and a major challenge.

But it is in our interests to deal with it - for two compelling reasons. Firstly, a functioning rule of law is the foundation for long term conflict resolution - and the prevention of its recurrence. The solutions to the 'drivers of conflict' in Kosovo - those issues that set people against each other - all have a basis in the rule of law. Resolving the fate of the many people still missing from Kosovo needs forensic medical structures. Helping refugees to return home needs functioning courts that can guarantee their property rights. Reconciling a divided society needs a criminal justice system that can give redress to victims.

Secondly, poor states with weak justice and police systems are easy prey for organised criminals; the kind of organised criminals that do damage across Europe, including in the UK. By working with the Kosovo government, and the EU's Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, EULEX, to improve Kosovo's abilities to fight organised and serious crime, we are tackling these problems at source.

I've written before about Kosovo's image abroad. Kosovo is known for having a serious problem with organised crime. However, even this can have a lighter side. After a large robbery in the UK, a local police service in England released details of a reward for information. We were contacted by a man who claimed to have information about the perpertrators and their addresses. We were excited; this was a large case, and it would be good to show that international co-operation could bring immediate results. I arranged for him to be interviewed by a British police officer serving in the UN, and I translated. As he arrived, the man introduced himself, and then said that "Jhon Smith" (sic) from "Djibt in Scotland" was responsible. How did he find this out, I asked? From my 'professional system' - he was a 'mjek popullor' - a witch doctor - and had used a ouija board. We just about managed to end the interview before collapsing into fits of laughter. That day's lesson - yes, there's a problem in Kosovo, but don't over-estimate it and end up chasing shadows.

For every one of these lighter moments, the Embassy assists on a large number of serious criminal investigations, by helping co-operation between Kosovo and UK law enforcement officers. But the most important contribution from the UK to the fight against crime in Kosovo are the numerous men and women who have served with the UNMIK police, and who will serve with EULEX. Their role has been vital in supporting a brand new police force - and the Kosovars appreciate this greatly. Although their work is not always visible in the UK, it has been vital in keeping the UK safe.

Posted at 10:09 26 June 2008 by Ruairi O'Connell  | 

Parallel Structures

Reading through comments of the last few entries, I'm glad that this blog has inspired some debate; I hope to see more comments in due course. We have seen from the last few days that Kosovo's independence arouses significant feelings.

One of the issues that has come up is that of 'parallel structures' in Kosovo. Rory, for example, asks "Why was it okay and even laudable for ethnic Albanians to have their parallel structures under Milosevic and not for Serbs to have them now under an Albanian-ruled Kosovo?".

A potted history of 'parallelism' in Kosovo may put things in context. In 1989, Milosevic managed, through force of arms, to remove Kosovo's autonomy. This led the Kosovo Albanians to set up their own parallel political structures (President and Parliament) to organise themselves politically. However, the Serbian government did not stop with political measures. Kosovo Albanians were removed from their jobs in socially-owned enterprises (the Yugoslav version of nationalised industries) and the publicly-owned enterprises (like the electricity plan and railways). They were expelled from school by force. They were excluded from hospitals. Their pensions were withdrawn; their savings seized by the Serbian government. In response, and funded by a voluntary 'tax' on the diaspora and private businesses in Kosovo, the Kosovo 'government in exile' funded a parallel healthcare and education system, with many teachers and doctors working for free.

In 1999, with the entry of NATO, this situation changed. A great many of the Serbs working in the 'socially-owned' enterprises left or were expelled (in many cases by the original workers whose jobs they had occupied since 1989). As the Serbian administration left, those Serbs employed in government and courts lost their jobs. Many Serbs left, either forced out or leaving due to fear. Much of the public sector disappeared.

Forwarding a few years, by 2004, there were functioning political, administrative, social, healthcare and education systems in Kosovo. The Kosovo Assembly includes [can we say how many out of how many?] reserved seats for the non-Albanian communities; the Kosovo Government, by law, includes Ministers from non-Albanian communities (currently two Kosovo Serbs and a Kosovo Turk). The 'Standards for Kosovo' were designed to ensure that the civil service was broadly representative of Kosovo society (see UNMIK's assessment ) The success rate was mixed; although it was rare for an institution to meet the informal 16% target for 'non-Albanian' representation (the Kosovo Police Service exceeded 20%), most reached at least high double figures (in the lack of a census since 1981, the Statistical Office of Kosovo estimates that 92% of the population are Kosovo Albanian).

In Kosovo Serb areas, the Kosovo government funded schools and healthcare establishments (as elsewhere). However, the Serbian government augmented this funding with its own direct funding. The Ahtisaari package (see previous blog entries) foresees this, and even stipulates that it must be allowed to continue.

There has, however, been a tendancy to use this 'top-up' funding as a means of exercising control over the Kosovo Serbs. For instance, in 2006 the Serbian government forced the Kosovo Serbs to withdraw from the Kosovo institutions and refuse their salaries, or else they would be refused the Serbian salary. This prompted President Ahtisaari to include transparency provisions in his plan to ensure that the funding would not be a tool of political manipulation.

Serbia has also, however, maintained parallel judicial structures that claim jurisdiction over Kosovo; most recently, radical Kosovo Serb leaders announced an intention to hold elections for government bodies in Kosovo under Serbian law. This goes far beyond support for Kosovo Serbs; it is a direct challenge to the legal order of Kosovo.

Put simply, Kosovo Albanian 'parallelism' was the inevitable and understandable result of exclusion from the state institutions. But now, the Standards for Kosovo and the Ahtisaari plan are there to make sure that the Kosovo Serbs are included in Kosovo's institutions (and some have taken up that place). It's vital that those Serbs are not now forced to quit these institutions under pressure to create 'parallel structures'. Instead, a place must be kept for them -  even if they don't take that place straight away.

Posted at 11:40 29 February 2008 by Ruairi O'Connell  |  Comments[1]