Ruairi O'Connell

Lunch with the Kosovo Minister of Education

Lunch yesterday with Enver Hoxhaj, the Kosovo Minister of Education.

He has a significant challenge in front of him. Most socialist societies in transition benefit from having had a decent (and often excellent) educational system. Not so Kosovo. Following years of neglect since the second World War, under Milosevic, the K-Albanians were forcibly thrown out of the education system (the Milosevic-era Rector of Pristina University even suggested that Albanians should not 'even be given a pencil', lest they learn to become terrorists; he was later appointed Rector of the Mitrovica University by the Kostunica Government). For nearly ten years, K-Albanians had no access to the education system. Instead, they were taught in private homes which served as informal schools and universities, supported by voluntary funding from the diaspora. Throughout this period, teachers - and pupils - were subject to constant harassment and intimidation (and worse) from the police.

On top of this, schools were caught up in the systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Whilst schools in major towns were left intact (as the Serbian authorities would use them for the Serbian community), those in the villages were destroyed (along with houses and other buildings); in one part of Kosovo, 60% of schools are still accommodated in portakabins, which are hardly suitable for winters that can reach -20C.

After the war UNMIK and the creation of the Kosovo Ministry for Education, tried to redress the wrongs of the past. Importantly, the right to education in one's own language was guaranteed early on in Kosovo law (and further guaranteed by the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal ).

In 2005, we were approached by the municipality of Novo Brdo/Novobërdë to help support the construction of a school in the municipality. Their concept was to (re)create a multiethnic school; separate classes would be organised in both Serbian and Albanian, but practical classes and sports would be organised together. This was an initiative of the K-Serb mayor, and seemed a great way to use education to bring the communities together. We rapidly agreed.

However, whilst the school is now built, and due to open in September, we fell foul of attempts to use education as a weapon of ethnic separation. The Serbian government from 2005 started to put pressure on K-Serbian teachers to withdraw from receiving Kosovo salaries, and work exclusively for the 'Serbian' parallel authorities; pupils were to be taught in 'Serbian' schools with no contact with other communities. Our hopes to have this school used by both Serbs and Albanians fell foul of this; the K-Serb pupils, rather than using a school in their own village, are still forced to travel for miles to their own separate school. Even the K-Serb mayor and officials couldn't shield their community from this pressure. It is still depressing to see such policies in action, leading the K-Serbian community into a dead end.

To end on a positive note, I met representatives from Hope and Aid Direct , a UK charity bringing aid to vulnerable communities in Kosovo. Having seen the awful situation, they developed a 'school in a box project' to bring basic supplies to Kosovo schools (a lucky rural school will have windows and heating; many don't have enough desks or chairs, and are forced to re-use paper until there is no space left) [just moved this to the end of the sentence]. They rely on donations from the public in the UK, and from businesses generously donating surpluses. He was here, in part, to discuss ways of reaching those most at need in all ethnic communities (their slogan is "we bring aid, not sides"); so having seen one education project fall foul of attempts to use education to divide people, it was heartening to talk to someone trying to use education to help all of Kosovo's communities; regardless of ethnicity, they all need rapid investment in education.

Posted at 16:33 26 June 2008 by Ruairi O'Connell  |  Comments[1]

The Kosovo Diaspora

Away from Kosovo for ten days; a good time to think about the impact of the Kosovo diaspora.

During the 1990s, driven by political repression and economic hardship, large numbers of Kosovo Albanians left Kosovo -the Kosovo government estimate that 17% (of a population of 1.8-2.4m) live outside Kosovo. A large number of Kosovo Turks also left (mostly to Turkey), and Kosovo Serbs (mostly to Serbia, where there were better economic opportunities). At the same time, Milosevic settled large numbers of Serbs displaced from Croatia and Bosnia in Kosovo - many of whom left, along with other Kosovo Serbs, following the entry of NATO and UNMIK in 1999 (and also following revenge attacks immediately after the conflict).

Historically, diaspora communities, especially in the US and Western Europe, have exerted vast influence on conflicts. In many cases, the diaspora have provided funding. But otherwise, they provide a community in which activists can mobilise, and a way of energising Western opinion. However, as the conflict progresses, the diaspora can be a brake to progress; they often remain untouched by reconciliation initiatives, and remain relatively unaffected by the privations of conflict. Historically, there is some evidence that diaspora continue to fund conflicts, in part to maintain a link with their country of origin; what price the feeling of patriotism?

Kosovo is no different regarding the influence the Kosovo Albanian diaspora had on Kosovo. Much of a generation left Kosovo in search of work and educational opportunities from the early 1990s onwards. During the 1990s, diaspora funds (through a levy collected by the 'government-in-exile') supported the parallel education and healthcare systems for the Kosovo Albanians, after Serbia had excluded them from state structures. Through remittances, most Kosovo Albanian families received help from relatives in the diaspora (help that continues today and is vital for Kosovo's economy). It printed newspapers, and, along with the BBC world service, provided a source of information in Kosovo. It acted as a base for lobbying on Kosovo. As Milosevic stepped up his campaign in Kosovo, and the KLA emerged in the mid-1990s, the diaspora also provided funding - and recruits - for the new force.

The Kosovo Albanian diaspora still has a vital role to play. Importantly, the diaspora has, in the main, supported the compromises made by the Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo as part of the final status process; this has been important in making them stick. The money has also kept on coming, but, perhaps, in lesser amounts than before. This is, however, a mixed blessing. The funds are vital to support many families, but they also distort the labour market. Kosovo has a relatively high 'reservation wage' (the notional wage necessary to attract new entrants into the labour market) compared to the region, which could potentially serve as an obstacle to economic development. The trick for Kosovo's government is to channel these payments away from support to everyday consumption and investment in Kosovo's future.

There is also a Kosovo Serb diaspora of sorts, consisting of those with links to Kosovo, and those displaced following the war. It is clear that the Kosovo institutions must do all that they can to show that, just as with Kosovo Albanians who left during the 1990s, Kosovo Serbs who left subsequently have a place in Kosovo's future. Not an easy task; but the alternative - separation and festering resentment - helps no-one.

Posted at 12:39 17 April 2008 by Ruairi O'Connell  | 

Parallel Structures

Reading through comments of the last few entries, I'm glad that this blog has inspired some debate; I hope to see more comments in due course. We have seen from the last few days that Kosovo's independence arouses significant feelings.

One of the issues that has come up is that of 'parallel structures' in Kosovo. Rory, for example, asks "Why was it okay and even laudable for ethnic Albanians to have their parallel structures under Milosevic and not for Serbs to have them now under an Albanian-ruled Kosovo?".

A potted history of 'parallelism' in Kosovo may put things in context. In 1989, Milosevic managed, through force of arms, to remove Kosovo's autonomy. This led the Kosovo Albanians to set up their own parallel political structures (President and Parliament) to organise themselves politically. However, the Serbian government did not stop with political measures. Kosovo Albanians were removed from their jobs in socially-owned enterprises (the Yugoslav version of nationalised industries) and the publicly-owned enterprises (like the electricity plan and railways). They were expelled from school by force. They were excluded from hospitals. Their pensions were withdrawn; their savings seized by the Serbian government. In response, and funded by a voluntary 'tax' on the diaspora and private businesses in Kosovo, the Kosovo 'government in exile' funded a parallel healthcare and education system, with many teachers and doctors working for free.

In 1999, with the entry of NATO, this situation changed. A great many of the Serbs working in the 'socially-owned' enterprises left or were expelled (in many cases by the original workers whose jobs they had occupied since 1989). As the Serbian administration left, those Serbs employed in government and courts lost their jobs. Many Serbs left, either forced out or leaving due to fear. Much of the public sector disappeared.

Forwarding a few years, by 2004, there were functioning political, administrative, social, healthcare and education systems in Kosovo. The Kosovo Assembly includes [can we say how many out of how many?] reserved seats for the non-Albanian communities; the Kosovo Government, by law, includes Ministers from non-Albanian communities (currently two Kosovo Serbs and a Kosovo Turk). The 'Standards for Kosovo' were designed to ensure that the civil service was broadly representative of Kosovo society (see UNMIK's assessment ) The success rate was mixed; although it was rare for an institution to meet the informal 16% target for 'non-Albanian' representation (the Kosovo Police Service exceeded 20%), most reached at least high double figures (in the lack of a census since 1981, the Statistical Office of Kosovo estimates that 92% of the population are Kosovo Albanian).

In Kosovo Serb areas, the Kosovo government funded schools and healthcare establishments (as elsewhere). However, the Serbian government augmented this funding with its own direct funding. The Ahtisaari package (see previous blog entries) foresees this, and even stipulates that it must be allowed to continue.

There has, however, been a tendancy to use this 'top-up' funding as a means of exercising control over the Kosovo Serbs. For instance, in 2006 the Serbian government forced the Kosovo Serbs to withdraw from the Kosovo institutions and refuse their salaries, or else they would be refused the Serbian salary. This prompted President Ahtisaari to include transparency provisions in his plan to ensure that the funding would not be a tool of political manipulation.

Serbia has also, however, maintained parallel judicial structures that claim jurisdiction over Kosovo; most recently, radical Kosovo Serb leaders announced an intention to hold elections for government bodies in Kosovo under Serbian law. This goes far beyond support for Kosovo Serbs; it is a direct challenge to the legal order of Kosovo.

Put simply, Kosovo Albanian 'parallelism' was the inevitable and understandable result of exclusion from the state institutions. But now, the Standards for Kosovo and the Ahtisaari plan are there to make sure that the Kosovo Serbs are included in Kosovo's institutions (and some have taken up that place). It's vital that those Serbs are not now forced to quit these institutions under pressure to create 'parallel structures'. Instead, a place must be kept for them -  even if they don't take that place straight away.

Posted at 11:40 29 February 2008 by Ruairi O'Connell  |  Comments[1]