Ruairi O'Connell

Deputy Head of British Embassy in Pristina

FCO Logo
Tuesday 12 February, 2008

Outreach II

I was down in the village of Babljak/Bablak*, south of Pristina, on Friday. An encouraging visit.

Bablak's history demonstrates an interesting problem in Kosovo. In 1999, the Albanian villagers were driven out, and many of their homes were destroyed. In 2004, many of the Serbian villagers in the Pristina had their houses burnt. In both cases, it was people from outside the village who caused the problems.

Relations in the village now are much the same as ever . The villagers talk to each other, get on, and have similar concerns, mostly about unemployment. The head of the municipal administration recently visited the village. The K-Serb villagers told me that the visit had been 'super'; they were happy to receive guarantees from him and the local police chief - but were now looking to the local politicians to fulfill their promises.  But both Serbian and Albanian villagers are concerned that 'outsiders' will cause problems in their village. This is a lesson that we have learnt since 2004. In order to promote values of tolerance, and reconcile the communities, we need to focus less on the point of interaction between the communities (i.e. stop having multiethnic round tables) and deal more directly with each community. 

This leads me to some of the points that Rory and Stefan have made - I look forward to hearing your thoughts.

The first is the idea that the Kosovo institutions discriminate against Kosovo Serbs, and that Kosovo Serbs cannot leave their villages 'without the danger of being shot'. Clearly, immediately after the conflict, when NATO entered, life was hard for the Kosovo Serbs. Many left - either by choice, through fear, or by force.  There were revenge killings directed against the Kosovo Serbs who had chosen to stay. Progress was made; but the events of March 2004 were a big setback, when 19 people (Serbs and Albanians) were killed in riots across Kosovo.

However, the situation has improved since. Regarding K-Serb safety, it is true to say that many Kosovo Serbs feel insecure - the outreach programme is meant to help address this. But levels of inter-ethnic violence are low and decreasing. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Kosovo Serbs come to Pristina daily, mostly, but not exclusively, for work. People speak Serbian on the streets. People interact in the villages; I was at a point-to-point horse race south of Pristina last year, where Serbs took part alongside Albanians (I was the only foreigner there - the multi-ethnicity was spontaneous, not prompted by the international community). The story isn't the same across Kosovo; Serbs in North Mitrovica (the divided city in Northern Kosovo - see http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3650&l=1) do not feel safe to travel to South Mitrovica, and Albanians in the South (excluding those few tolerated in North Mitrovica) are prevented from crossing the river that divides the city by leather-jacketed thugs. But I can't agree that Serbs in Kosovo are in danger of being shot if they leave their homes; things have improved.

Equally, about the Kosovo government. I've frequently said in the past (including in the Kosovo media) that I'm not paid to lobby on behalf of the Kosovo government. They have got things wrong. But how one responds to problems is quite indicative. The riots of March 2004 were appalling. But the Kosovo government's reaction to it, I think, is interesting. Unprompted, they pledged to rebuild, from their own funds (the Kosovo budget even today is less than 1bn euro annually) every destroyed house and church. They have come through - although Church reconstruction is held up by disagreements in the committee designed to oversee the process, almost every house has been rebuilt.

The sense I got from  my current and previous work in the Balkans is that it is almost impossible to talk about the Balkans without people seeing the issue in a zero sum way; if you want to help Albanians, then you must be 'against' the Serbs.

It is clear that the Serbs have suffered too since the start of the 1990s. My Serb friends often tell me that the Serbs were Milosevic's biggest victims. I don't buy this. But I would agree that no-one has done more harm to the Serbs - whether in Serbia or elsewhere - than Milosevic and the people who carried out his policies. In any case, I am clear about what our (UK, Europe, my) long-term goal is - it's to get the whole of the region ready for EU membership. The only way for this to work, is to shed the zero-sum mentality.

* All Kosovo's villages, towns and cities have at least two names - in Serbian and Albanian, and sometimes also in Turkish - similar to Londonderry/Derry in Northern Ireland. The UN convention is to list both in English, putting the name used by the majority population first. We follow this convention, but it can be a bit clunky, especially in speech ("I went to Ferizaj/Urosevac the other day"), so I often mix it up - use one name first, then the other. This works in Kosovo (where everyone knows the various names), but can be confusing for outsiders at first.

  • Share this with:
Comments:

The material on the outreach effort to Serbs was interesting. I'm glad that this adopt a village effort is being made, but I'm worried that a higher level of outreach seems to be missing.brI'm a bit surprised that the Quint diplomatic liaison offices haven't forced a stronger outreach effort from the new government in the run up to the independence declaration. Pristina was allowed to drop attempts to bridge the divide with Kosovo Serbs during the Troika talks and the election campaign, and little time or energy has been devoted since. Prime Minister Thaci and President Sejdiu visited a safely receptive Serb village each in recent weeks, voicing expected platitudes and rounding it off with the cute gift of a tractor to a cuddly Serb villager. brBut neither larger Serb enclaves nor Serbian media appear to have been targeted with reassuring or substantive messages, nor has the key Kosovo Serb fear that independence equals destruction of "their" parallel institutions been addressed. Thaci's wooden refusal at a news conference in the Serb enclave of Caglavica to acknowledge that the KLA committed any crimes played badly in the Serbian media, offering nothing to Kosovo Serbs, still smarting from the killings and kidnappings of the second half of 1999, and was an unnecessary own goal. PM Thaci and President Sejdiu should be prevailed upon to say clearly, convincingly and in a forum that Serb media will pick up that they will not destroy the parallel institutions, but gradually negotiate them into a relationship with the Kosovo state, on terms that Kosovo Serbs are comfortable with i.e. nothing more than the Ahtisaari supervised independence plan stipulates. brThe profile of the mixed international-local outreach working groups in Pristina is low and focus seems over-narrow, directed at crisis management and information flow for the day of independence declaration, rather than the broader communication and bridge-building that could give Albanians and Serbs a shared script for the transition. Simply put, such a script could be: "we disagree on the status, we agree not to fight about it".br

Posted by Alex Anderson on February 12, 2008 at 07:56 PM GMT #

Thank you for sharing your thoughts and observations on the situation in Kosovo presently. I have to say that your sunny Rousseauist view of Kosovo is certainly not shared by the NGOs and others who I have talked to and you might want to consider just why so many Kosovo Serbs voted for the SRS in the recent presidential elections rather than for Tadic, incidentally just as they voted Milosevic for president in 2000. brbrI realise that as an ambitious young diplomat you have a government line to follow and I hope you are right that the rights of not just the Serb minority but also all non-Albanian minorities as well as the rights of non-nationalist Albanians will be protected. Only time will tell. I personally cannot be as optimistic as you. I think one of the basic flaws of your argument is to treat the Kosovo government as it is currently constituted as if it were a normal functioning administration. It is not. It is made up, at least in the postions of real power, of men who wrere members of a violent and intolerant terrorist movement, some of whose members are now on trial for war crimes. Therefore, its publicity stunts in the name of ethnic tolerance are always likely to ring slightly hollow for the minorities which suffered at its hands in the late 1990s. The fact that the forrmer prime minister of Kosovo is now on trial for war crimes is rather telling. The insinuation that Serbs left southern Mitrovica due to their own free choice while Albanians were forced out by "leather jacketed thugs" does not really stand up to scrutiny. After all, the evidence suggests that the Kosovo Albanians have plenty of their own leather-jacketed thugs. All in all, the government of Kosovo have done more than simply get a few things wrong. I would also strongly question your assumption that things only started going wrong for the Serbs with the arrival of Milosevic and the nationalists on the scene: indeed, one of the primary reasons for the sudden rise of Milosevic in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the palpable feeling among many Serbs in Kosovo that they were no longer welcome in a nationalist Albanian Kosovo. Indeed, the situation became sufficiently bad for the-then Kosovo Albanian Communist functionary Alija Shukria to give a speech in which he specifically admonished Albanian nationalists for their treatment of the Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities. Likewise, Milosevic's polices might have been disastrous in Croatia, but to blame Milosevic for all the ills which happened there would be to let too many other guilty politicians off the hook - not least Croatia's Franjo Tudjman. brbrThis brings me to the other substantive point which is related to the first. I notice that you did not manage to answer one of my questions from my last posting - namely why NATO failed to protect the Serbs of the Krajina and the Medak Pocket when they were under attack and intimidation from the Croatian army. However, you might be interested to know that one of the commanders in charge of these military operations was Agim Ceku, who was the later PM of Kosovo. I haven't been to Kosovo recently but I can tell you about the situation in Croatia nearly ten years after the ending of hostilities there. I lived in Croatia as recently as the summer of 2005 and was last there in October 2007. The level of discrimination is still great albeit subtle despite the many strides and advances which the government of Ivo Sanader has made and in Zagreb, at least, many Serbs are now bringing their children up as Catholics as they consider that this is the only way that they have any prospect of advancing in today's Croatia. When I was there in the summer of 2005, local parents in one village demanded the sacking of two of the local school's primary teachers because they did not want their children being taught by Serbs. brbrFor the record, I don't subscribe to the zero sub game as you express it and I certainly don't believe that helping the Albanians means necessarily discriminating against the Serbs and by the saem token, I also don't believe that assisting the Serbs would necessarily mean hindering the Albanians. However, I do believe that it is important not just to be fair, but also to be seen to be fair and in this I think the EU, NATO and the British government too has failed quite spectacularly. Either ethnic cleansing and extreme nationalism are always wrong or they are not. Why was it okay and even laudable for ethnic Albanians to have their parallel structures under Milosevic and not for Serbs to have them now under an Albanian-ruled Kosovo? Why is it okay for ethnic Albanians in Kosovo to split off from Serbia and form their own breakaway republic and not for Serbs in Kosovo who so wish or indeed in Croatia and Bosnia to form their own independent ethnic states? Why was ethnic cleansing condemned and even reversed in Kosovo and accepted and even lauded in Croatia in 1995 and Kosovo following the entry of NATO troops? I'm sorry, but you can't be a little bit pregnant.

Posted by Rory Yeomans on February 14, 2008 at 05:57 PM GMT #

I agree that outreach is important in the next few weeks or maybe months. But I hope the international community helps Kosovo do something more useful, after status. This comment has to do with the international policy of the past eight years and the fear that it may continue in the future, and not your visits which I find very important at this time. brbrI have a problem with the whole approach towards the minority problem applied in Kosovo. Understandably, we all want Serbs to integrate into the Kosovar society, but the persistence of UNMIK and the international community to focus so much of our attention on minorities has been a waste of time and resources if not damaging. The international community should focus on the economy and youth! Instead of overwhelming the government by pressuring them to do something that looks good on the international media, assist them to develop the country and the economy and in that way we help resolve most other problems. brbrWe have at least two big problems that make us unique in our continent: we are probably the poorest country of Europe and we have the largest proportion of youth in our continent. Our minority problems are not unique; we join a large number of countries with similar problems. Thus, the minority problems should be put in context.brbrWhat the Kosovar institutions have done in this field is absolutely exemplary. The numbers speak for themselves money invested, houses and religious sites rebuilt, acceptance of the unique positive discrimination in institutions, continuous outreach…. However, even if you make every single Albanian do outreach in every single Serb village starting Monday, the Serbs will only integrate if Belgrade tells them to do so. Moreover, how can we convince a Serb from Babljak to love an independent Kosovo, if we keep Kosovo the poorest region in Europe?brbrEight years after the war, with billions of Euros invested we still have power cuts, we still have 45 unemployment and we still have a rotten educational system. What’s worse, we have had limited success also where we focused most of our attention, the minorities. I would rather see pressure being made for sound economic development policies. I believe we would be of much more service if we help a British company invest in Babljak on a chips plant than on forcing the whole Cabinet to put “visit to Babljak” on their agendas every single day for the next 10 years. br

Posted by Dardan on February 16, 2008 at 10:31 AM GMT #

Post a Comment:
Comments are closed for this entry.

Calendar

Search

Feeds

Tag cloud

FCO bloggers

FCO partners overseas

FCO websites

UK government websites

Your feedback