Jim Murphy

Part One as Commentary:-brHi/Hello Jim Murphy – Thank you for drawing attention to Reports of UK Parliament Select Committee linking my research interests from 1999 onwards. On the subject of ‘Missile Defence’, that situation was of concern on the accession of President George W. Bush post-January 2001. One could understand why the USA’s ‘National Missile Defence’ was still an USA security ideal, i.e. to obviate nuclear destruction on New York and other metropolitan targets. However NMD was neither technically proven nor ready. But President Bush wanted its development. Even if operational, NMD would never be 100 secure, resulting in unilateral abrogation of the very pertinent USA/Russia 1972 Treaty. Moreover AMD USA-Allies was more complex, even for Europe. And TMD Theatre defence by USA military-forces in conflict had limited utility - it had to obviate any enemy’s defensive missile-attacks with abc-crude warheads atom-nukes, biological and chemical WMDsbrBut came USA’s 9/11, a caesura with all-change military policy-mix: would NMD have prevented 9/11? Conclusions can well doubt that, because always a next attack might succeed. So warfare might still have had preventively to destroy les responsables in Afghanistan. Also likely then, the Putin-Bush alliance. And NATO’s immediate show of solidarity. Perhaps then for the present pro-paganda: what feasibilities have been developed or even achieved for NMD/AMD? Also has NATO, in its global role-play, been assured that there has been an admiring consensus that ballistic missile defence BMD as such works with at least approaching 100 strike success pace decoys?brOn all subjects of ‘NATO’, leading to ‘EU-Russia relations’, an ongoing co-monitoring was ever slanted to ‘UK-Russia relations in the EU framework’, but limited to the EU’s old ‘second pillar’. That arrangement still rests under control of each member-state’s politico-individual decision rights – effectively to be globally improved via the ‘Reform Treaty’ of Lisbon. As first mooted, one problem-simplified would have been, to give precedence to new EU membership, as priority per se and status-flexible priority. But before any rushed NATO expansion where unproductive, were its implications never evaluated fully? Or were they re-deliberated fully around NATO’s Prague Summit in Nov/Dec 2002? Or surely different military-concepts were inherent in USA’s ‘Theatre Missile Defence’, that realist anxiety approaching the War on Iraq end-March 2003 of paramount importance with USA’s coalition of NATO’s willing awaiting action for regime-change? Hence “old” Europe already tended to refusing our sole-remaining global superpower’s NATO-solidarity expectations!brContinued Commentary – see Part 2.br

Posted by Stefan Peter. on March 06, 2008 at 11:21 AM GMT #