Jim Murphy

Minister for Europe

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Monday 18 February, 2008

More on Russia

Thanks for the comments. In response to the questions I thought you might find the report by the Foreign Affairs Committee on Russia of interest.

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Part One as Commentary:-brHi/Hello Jim Murphy – Thank you for drawing attention to Reports of UK Parliament Select Committee linking my research interests from 1999 onwards. On the subject of ‘Missile Defence’, that situation was of concern on the accession of President George W. Bush post-January 2001. One could understand why the USA’s ‘National Missile Defence’ was still an USA security ideal, i.e. to obviate nuclear destruction on New York and other metropolitan targets. However NMD was neither technically proven nor ready. But President Bush wanted its development. Even if operational, NMD would never be 100 secure, resulting in unilateral abrogation of the very pertinent USA/Russia 1972 Treaty. Moreover AMD USA-Allies was more complex, even for Europe. And TMD Theatre defence by USA military-forces in conflict had limited utility - it had to obviate any enemy’s defensive missile-attacks with abc-crude warheads atom-nukes, biological and chemical WMDsbrBut came USA’s 9/11, a caesura with all-change military policy-mix: would NMD have prevented 9/11? Conclusions can well doubt that, because always a next attack might succeed. So warfare might still have had preventively to destroy les responsables in Afghanistan. Also likely then, the Putin-Bush alliance. And NATO’s immediate show of solidarity. Perhaps then for the present pro-paganda: what feasibilities have been developed or even achieved for NMD/AMD? Also has NATO, in its global role-play, been assured that there has been an admiring consensus that ballistic missile defence BMD as such works with at least approaching 100 strike success pace decoys?brOn all subjects of ‘NATO’, leading to ‘EU-Russia relations’, an ongoing co-monitoring was ever slanted to ‘UK-Russia relations in the EU framework’, but limited to the EU’s old ‘second pillar’. That arrangement still rests under control of each member-state’s politico-individual decision rights – effectively to be globally improved via the ‘Reform Treaty’ of Lisbon. As first mooted, one problem-simplified would have been, to give precedence to new EU membership, as priority per se and status-flexible priority. But before any rushed NATO expansion where unproductive, were its implications never evaluated fully? Or were they re-deliberated fully around NATO’s Prague Summit in Nov/Dec 2002? Or surely different military-concepts were inherent in USA’s ‘Theatre Missile Defence’, that realist anxiety approaching the War on Iraq end-March 2003 of paramount importance with USA’s coalition of NATO’s willing awaiting action for regime-change? Hence “old” Europe already tended to refusing our sole-remaining global superpower’s NATO-solidarity expectations!brContinued Commentary – see Part 2.br

Posted by Stefan Peter. on March 06, 2008 at 11:21 AM GMT #

Continuing Commentary – from Part 1.brPart 2 Commentary:-br“The EU” now might militarise itself within NATO for global warfare! Are we getting away from more flexible concepts of ESDINATO? The latter coincided even after ending of the ‘Cold War’ with ‘the European members of NATO’, subservient to hegemonic USANATO. Since initial 50 years jubilee expansion, NATO expansionism has advanced prematurely – instead of neutralising present CFSPEU membership of 27 where advantageous to Europe. Through politico-military modelling ERRFsESDP on global Atlanticism, small wonder that selective membership in NATO’s ‘coalitions of the willing’ becomes ever more unreliable, with limits on new-role EUNATO solidarity apparent inexplicable to USA/UK alone.brHistory is an ongoing sequence: originally the EU was too late and militarily too weak, though brave effort by humanitarian coalitions for Bosnia-Herzegovina; then NATO too late, but USA enforced peace by Dayton Accords. So one might well with hindsight see a continuing un-readiness: not only with our EU’s ESDPCFSP, but also with ESDINATO - the hegemonic USA was never finding NATO’s new roles easily. So came and so didn’t come President George W. Bush’s coalitions of the NATO-willing.brHowever, by means of simplified military task-allocations, would it not prove itself maximally-effective to reserve the 21st Century global role to NATO per se. Both USANATO, with the EU’s co-members of NATO, then could well decide on putting together NATO coalitions of the to be global-task combatant-willed. Decision-making philosophy then must be reformed from old USA hegemonic conservatism. Or should ESDP be amalgamed into NATO sans advantage – then back to the future square one?brOn the other hand there wasn’t need for any EU Rapid Reaction Forces to be modelled onto NATO. Best maybe for all concerned that ESDP should develop free structures of autonomous planning, limited to Petersberg Tasks of peace maintenance in non-global macro-regional military roles. So the future concept may prove effective for peace via work-allocation: CFSPEU by consensus policy-mixes – but then delegated to EU militaries of proven competences, ready and reserved, as now proposed by President Nicolas Sarkozy. Less-combative peace-maintainer duties then may devolve on all EU member-states, including for designated neutrals. Hence cross-regional securities can also be enhanced. Theoretical exemplar of the three Baltic republics: if first designated “European Neutrals” in the EU’s macro-regional security system, there wouldn’t ensue any real loss of defence protection, as NATO Art.5 can no longer be an assumed scenario. Or why insist on NATO role-sovereignty?br

Posted by Stefan Peter. on March 06, 2008 at 02:45 PM GMT #

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