John Duncan

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Friday 30 January, 2009

LIFTING THE NUCLEAR SHADOW: WHAT THE PUBLIC THINKS

As part of our ongoing dialogue on how to achieve a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, David Miliband will launch next week a new public consultation paper. He has also given an interview on BBC’s World Tonight programme (Thursday 29th edition) which covers many of the issues we deal with in Geneva.

Making progress in Nuclear Non proliferation and Disarmament is vital to the security of our world both now and for future generations. Climate change has increased the demand for cleaner energy, but we cannot allow this to increase the risk of nuclear wars.

The Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in New York next year will be the moment when the world community comes together to look at how far we have got towards stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, and setting the world on the path towards nuclear abolition. Diplomats will meet in New York in May this year to set out the agenda for the Review Conference.

Our consultation paper aims to encourage wider public to speak up. It outlines the large number of practical measures the UK is taking, (in addition to reducing our own nuclear arsenal down 75% since the end of the Cold war) such as:

- a major conference this March, called by Gordon Brown, to develop further proposals for minimising the proliferation risks which could arise with the global expansion of civil nuclear power;

- building greater confidence in nuclear disarmament through the pioneering work by our Atomic Weapons Establishment on the verification of nuclear disarmament, including their work with Norway and the verification NGO, VERTIC and a conference of the recognised nuclear weapons states to discuss the way forward on verification.

Those of us at the negotiating front line need your voice to be heard. The BBC is inviting listeners’ comments.
There will be a live web stream of the launch of the new paper on the FCO website and the video will be available to download. So please do engage in the debate.

Posted at 19:29 30 January 2009 by John Duncan | Comments[12]

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Comments:

This is a fairly Orwellian posting. Why does Britain have nuclear weapons? And why are we upgrading Trident? Britain has 200 nuclear weapons. Why? Britain should make a powerful gesture by announcing the scraping of all nuclear weapons. Unfortunately even Britain couldn't manage this since America controls Britain's so-called independent deterent. Britain couldn't fire a missile without US permission. And they couldn't scrap it without US permission. Once Bush's puppet now Obama's puppet.

Posted by Stu on February 01, 2009 at 04:42 PM GMT #

Dear Stu Thanks for the post. You might want to see my earlier post in January, which covers some of the points you make, in particular that the UK is not "upgrading" Trident, nor do we need US Permission to launch the trident missile, or indeed scrap it should we so choose. I will post the link to the MOD's fact sheet which makes clear what exactly the government has decided to do and what future decisions will remain.

Posted by John Duncan on February 01, 2009 at 05:57 PM GMT #

In terms of this countries possession of nuclear weapons I found the letter included in The Times [16 January 2009] of particular interest viz. Field Marshall Lord Bramall, General Lord Ramsbottom and General Sir Hugh Beach, jointly suggest that 'our independent deterrent has become virtually irrelevent' and that 'the case is much stronger for funding our Armed Forces with what they need to meet the commitments actually laid upon them'. Of course, our giving up our nuclear capability doesn't address concerns regarding the development/potential use of nuclear weapons by other countries/parties.

Posted by Michael on February 03, 2009 at 05:15 PM GMT #

Michael Thank you for your comment. As you imply the future of the UK's deterent is inextricably linked to the wider issue of how we get to a world free of nuclear weapons. A useful independant source of information on the Trident decision and facts about the system itself can be found on the BBC website at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4805768.stm

Posted by John Duncan on February 03, 2009 at 06:17 PM GMT #

I am concerned about the statement in Lifting the Nuclear Shadow that “our serious commitment to global nuclear disarmament should not be confused with unilateral disarmament” and the Foreign Secretary’s recent comments to the press highlighting the distinction between multilateral disarmament, which the Government supports, and unilateral disarmament. As the paper acknowledges, the UK has in the past made a series of unilateral disarmament moves by reduced the explosive power, operational status and type of forces deployed. These measures have not been dependent on reciprocal moves by other nations. They have been said to be in compliance with the UK’s Treaty obligations under Article 6 of the NPT. Am I correct in interpreting the recent statements as meaning that the UK has ruled out making any similar unilateral moves in future and that further reductions in the size or operational status of British nuclear forces will only be made as part of what are specific identifiable multilateral treaties, such as SALT and START, as distinct from the general obligations under Article 6 of the NPT ? If this is not the case, perhaps the Foreign Office should stop implying that multilateral disarmament is good and unilateral disarmament is bad.

Posted by John Ainslie on February 05, 2009 at 03:02 PM GMT #

I attended the Foreign Secretary's launch of the new pamphlet: 'Lifting the nuclear shadow: Creating the conditions for abolishing nuclear weapons', at the IISS in London on 4 February. amongst other things, Mr Miliband criticised Iran's failure to comply with its NPT obligations. When Iran is criticised over its atomic aspirations, it should be remembered that there are several other NPT signatories in breach of their obligations, the United Kingdom among them. By chance, almost exactly forty one years ago some key decisions were taken to establish the foundation stones for the NPT. Papers I consulted at the National Archives in Kew show that on January 23, 1968 Fred later Lord Mulley, as the UK Labour minister of state for foreign affairs, addressed the 358th plenary meeting of the United Nations 18-nation Committee on Disarmament ENDC in Geneva, explaining why nations should sign up to the newly negotiated NPT, telling the ministerial delegations: "As I have made clear in previous speeches, my government accepts the obligation to participate fully in the negotiations required by [NPT] Article VI and it is our desire that these negotiations should begin as soon as possible and should produce speedy and successful results. There is no excuse now for allowing a long delay to follow the signing of this treaty." Shortly after, on January 26 1968, a confidential memo by Mulley for the cabinet defence and oversea sic policy committee laid out the United Kingdom's position on the key nuclear disarmament clause, which became NPT article V1, noting "A number of countries may withhold their ratification of the treaty until nuclear-weapon states show they are taking seriously the obligations which this article imposes on them. It will therefore be essential to follow the treaty up quickly my emphasis with the further disarmament measures if it is to be brought into force and remain in force thereafter. ." A few days afterwards, on January 30 1968, and the NPT was presented to the Cabinet for its endorsement. A supportive foreign office memo stated: "a lot of the thinking behind the treaty, and some of the language, originally came from us." The NPT committed its signatories to negotiate complete nuclear disarmament "in good faith", and "at an early date." Neither has been delivered, as Tehran might fairly point out in the subsequent four decades. Moreover, the official Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation IAEO is a 40 shareholder, with French state-owned nuclear conglomerate, Areva, in SOFIDIF, a uranium enrichment joint-venture company. It arrangement dates back to 23 February 1974, and remains in place. SOFIDIF still retains a 25 share in EURODIF, the international uranium enrichment consortium that runs France’s huge plant in Pierrelatte in the south of France. The IAEO drew a net income from dividends of some Euro 7 million in 2005, according to a report prepared by Paris-based researcher Mycle Schneider, for the European Parliament in March 2007. So when Iran is lectured on its NPT compliance, the respective record of non-compliance, and of active collaboration on enrichment, by two of the nuclear weapons states parties the NPT, should be born in mind. President Obama's new more open engagement of Iran is, however, to be welcomed. Dr David Lowry former director, European Proliferation Information Centre, EPIC Stoneleigh Surrey

Posted by Dr David Lowry on February 05, 2009 at 07:02 PM GMT #

Dear Dr Lowry, Thank you for the extensive comment on your research into the background to the UK’s decision to sign the NPT. The question you ask about SOFIDIF and IAEO is a very detailed point on an issue where other members of the FCO lead, but I have asked for you to be given a response. You suggest that the UK is in breach of it’s NPT obligations. We do not agree with your interpretation of how article VI should be read. For other readers the text can be found on the net, for example on Wikepedia http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nuclear_Non-Proliferation_Treaty. The Nuclear Weapons States NWS agreed to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures” towards the objectives that are set out in that article. Crucially they did not agree to begin negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament or a treaty. As this weeks paper explains in section 5 the Nuclear Weapons States have indeed negotiated a series of measures or taken independent steps leading to very significant disarmament of nuclear arsenals. Consequently while others may judge that the NWS could have done more we are not in breach of our NPT obligations. This contrasts with Iran who when signing the NPT undertook not to develop Nuclear weapons, but subsequently admitted to having had a programme to do so and whose current enrichment programme has led to considerable international concern that they have revived plans to develop weapons in breach of their NPT obligations.

Posted by John Duncan on February 06, 2009 at 07:19 PM GMT #

John Thanks for your brief response. It is a significant improvement on the zero response I have received in 25 years of exposing the UK's record of limited compliance with NPTobligations to critical appraisal, including at two NPT review conferences. I could have quoted far more detail from the papers at the National Archive on the UK negotiating record in the 1965-68 period on the NPT, but the limited space in blogs does not allow it. But you would find, had you read the primary UK papers as I have done, and suspect you haven't from your brief biographical details, that my interpretation of what the UK believed it was committing to in July 1968 Article 6 was what I have argued, and not your post hoc interpretation, which may be present policy, but not what was originally agreed. As a matter of interest, what time period would you regard as being a fair representation of the Article 6 phrase "at an early date"? Keep up the dialogue. David

Posted by Dr David Lowry on February 07, 2009 at 01:46 AM GMT #

John Ainslie asks about unilateral disarmament. I am afraid I don't see where the confusion lies here. David Miliband's introduction does not imply that unilateral steps by individual NWS "are bad". He makes clear and the paper also explains that we do not see complete unilateral disarmament by the UK as being the way forward. That does not rule out further unilateral reductions in our nuclear arsenal, but as the White Paper on Trident makes clear the Government considers that the current level is the minimum required.

Posted by John Duncan on February 07, 2009 at 07:18 AM GMT #

John, There is no mention of tritium in the LNS document. Can one take it that with the closing of Chapel Cross the UK is allowing the "dial a bang" feature of its nuclear weapons to naturally decay?

Posted by Terry Jones on February 08, 2009 at 08:12 PM GMT #

Dear Dr Lowry, I promised you a response to your point on Iran. I have been passed the following by my colleagues who lead on this issue "We note your comments about the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation shareholding in SOFIDIF. They are really for the French Government to answer, but our understanding is that, as a result of the asset freeze established by UN sanctions against Iran, AEOI cannot currently access any SOFIDIF dividend payments. The sanctions cut AEOI off from an important income stream, and thus provide financial as well as legal and political reasons for Iran to stop enriching." I hope this is helpful, but as I say it is an issue where others lead.

Posted by John Duncan on February 09, 2009 at 04:35 PM GMT #

I notice that the six point plan in "Lifting the Nuclear Shadow" doesn't commit Britain to doing anything until point six - when we will start talking ! And I don't see a 20 reduction in the UK's planned number of nuclear weapons from 200 to 160 as much to boast about - cutting by 50 would be much more significant. Also there doesn't seem to be any reference to Israel's nuclear weapons there rarely is! The world has moved on since nuclear weapons were developed - British nuclear weapons serve no purpose now, other than to encourage other states to acquire them so that they can be one of the "big boys".

John Duncan

Ambassador for Multilateral Arms Control & Disarmament

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